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The concept of "property rights" plays a
prominentrole in economic theory.Economists
havebeen studyinghow propertyrightsemerged
as a system of allocation,replacing regimes of
open access and lack of legal order. Property
rightsare regularlyviewed by economistsas the
primarypolicy tool to control the incentives to
invest in new assets (e.g., in information)and to
maintain existing assets (e.g., fisheries) when
contractsare incomplete.Propertyrightsare the
endowmentsthat individualsexchangein a market economy, the equity that investors trade in
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financial markets. Property rights are a basic
buildingblock in economics.
But what are propertyrights?While "assets"
are physical,natural,things,the rightsof individuals in the assets are an abstractlegal creation.
Economists usually focus on one aspect of the
right in the asset: the right to control. Legal
analysisof property rights, on the other hand,
adds anotheraspect of the rightin the asset:the
privilege of an individualto invoke the state's
enforcement powers to fend off encroachments
by nonrightholders.A propertyright, then, is a
"pair"that is defined by (1) the physicaluses that
the rightholderis entitled to make ("theentitlement")and (2) the particularenforcementtechniques that the state accords the rightholderin
the event that others are violatingor threatening
to violatethe entitlement("theprotection").
Recognizingthat propertyrightshave this dual
structure-"entitlement" and "protection"opens up a rich arrayof possibilitiesfor designing property rights. Society has to choose not
only the identity of the rightholder,namely, to
whom the "entitlement"ought to be assigned,
but also how to protect property rights. In the
past generation,legal scholarsinfluenced by the
law-and-economics school of thought have
shown that the protectiontechnique is as fundamental to the assignmentof property rights as
the entitlementitself. A mini-fieldhas developed
studying the formal characteristicsof different
protectionregimes.One of the most creativeand
prolificcontributorsto this movement,Ian Ayres
of YaleLaw School, has now assembledhis contributionsinto an impressivelyrich theory titled
OptionalLaw.
The startingpoint for this book was defined
over thirty years ago by Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed in one of modem law'smost
influentialandintelligentarticles.At a time when
legal analysis was partitioned into rigid fields
such as contractlaw (obligationscreated voluntarily), tort law (involuntaryobligationscreated
by harmingothers),andpropertylaw (the catalog
of rights to control assets), Calabresi and
Melamedoffereda new, generalwayto look at all
legal rights.Focusingon the "protection"aspect,
they coined the distinctionbetween two types of
protections, "property rules" versus "liability
rules."An entitlementis protectedby a property
rule through deterring others from violating it
(e.g., throughinjunctions,punitivedamages,and
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even prisonterms). Conversely,an entitlementis
protectedby liabilityrules throughcompensating
the entitlement holder when a violationoccurs.
To illustrate,considera right formedby contract
(say,the rightof a buyerto receive from the seller the parcel of land which the buyer bought).
This contractualright is the "entitlement"portion, but how is it protected when the seller
breachesand refusesto makethe promisedtransfer? Under a "propertyrule"regime, the buyer
can invoke remedies that deter the seller from
breachingthe contract(e.g., large punitivedamages; or a court order mandatingperformance,
enforcedby the threatto place the sellerin jail or
pay large fines if he defies the order). Under a
"liability rule" regime, the buyer can invoke
remedies that compensateher for the monetary
loss arisingfrom nonperformanceof the promise
(e.g., damagesequal to the buyer'svaluationof
the parcel of land-what contract law calls
"expectationdamages").
Calabresiand Melameddid not only introduce
this distinctionbetween the two types of protections, they also offered a fundamentalinsight as
to when the law should accordone type of protection versus another. Property rules make
sense, they claimed,when transactionscosts are
low. Since they deter potential violators from
committingunilateralbreachesandforce them to
reach consensual transactions,efficient allocations would be assured(this, recall,is the Coase
Theorem.) But when transactioncosts are high
and consensualtransactionsdo not occur,liability rulesbecome the efficient mode of protection.
An outsiderwho wantsto acquirethe entitlement
from the legal rightholderneed not spend (or be
discouragedby) the high transactionscosts of a
voluntarydeal, but may rathertake the entitlement unilaterallyand pay the legallyset damages
to the rightholder.A liabilityrule regime attaches
a price to the asset and grants outsiders the
power-the option-to take the asset if they pay
this price.
Viewingthe protectioncomponentof a liability
rule as a call option-the option for anypotential
infringerto take the entitlement if it pays the
exercise price of the legally fixed damagesopened a fertile ground for research. For one, if
the protection component is an option, it need
not be restricted to call options, but can be
expanded and include put options. Whereas the
call option liability rule grants the option holder
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the right to take the asset for a fixed damages
sum, the put option liabilityrule would grantthe
ownerof the asset the rightto force a sale and be
paid a fixed sum for surrenderingthe asset. She
need not secure the agreementof the transferee;
she may even target an unwilling beneficiary,
forcing him to accept the asset and to pay the
nonnegotiatedsum.
Enter IanAyres.Put options,he noticed,do not
exhaustthe possibilitiesaffordedby optiontheory
for the design of the protection component of
propertyrights. In a barrageof creativity,Ayres
invents a host of new options to be attachedto
entitlements. Consider one example, a "DualChooser"option. If Jackhas an entitlementand
Jillhas a calloptionto takeJack'sassetandpaythe
legallyfixeddamages,why not grantJacka reciprocal call option to take his asset back? In fact,
once we open the door for such sequential
options,manyversionscan be considered.Under
one versionof the dualoptionscheme,Jackwould
merelyhaveto paythe sameexercisepriceJillhad
to pay to reacquirehis asset. Ayrescalls this rule
the "single-price"dual-chooser rule. Under a
more sophisticatedversion,the option prices are
escalated.JillmaytakeJack'sassetfor the price of
pi; Jackmaytakehis assetbackbut for a different
price,P2, potentiallyhigherthan pi. In fact, why
have only two rounds with two prices?
Theoretically,Jack and Jill can keep taking the
asset from each other, with the price increasing
per round,untilone dropsout. Suchhigherorder
sequentialoptions are the equivalentof an auction mechanism,and as an auction "surrogate"
they have the potentialof allocatingthe asset in a
more nuanced way toward its highest valuing
party.
But recognizing(or inventing)new platforms
for legal allocationsof assets is only the starting
point for the analysisin OptionalLaw. The basic
normativequestionremains:whatbenefit society
gainsby these option schemes?When shouldthe
law allow a party to take another'sasset for a
price? And when should it do the reverse, and
allow the asset owner to force anotherparty to
take the asset and to pay for it, without first
securing consent. Is there any social value in
dual-chooser rules?
If assets are to flow to their most efficient valuers, it may appear at first blush that society
would need a great deal of information to assign
the entitlements efficiently. If the value that

individualsassignto assets is often privateinformation,courts cannot simply measurethe competing valuations. Moreover, with asymmetric
information,partiescompetingfor the use of an
asset may not always succeed in consensually
agreeing on the efficient allocation. The trick,
then, is to design a legal mechanismthat would
implement efficient allocations.Options, Ayres
shows, "harness"individuals'private information. They induce the option holders to act in
accordancewith their information,thus reveal
whether they are the highest valuers.
Considera simple example:Jack,the owner of
an asset, values it at $50. Jill, a potential taker,
has a valuationthat, while known only to her, is
knownto lie uniformlyon a continuumbetween
0 and $100. In the presence of high transactions
costs, Jackand Jill are not certain to succeed in
agreeing on a sale of the asset to Jill whenever
she values it more than $50. But if Jill is granted
a call option to take Jack'sasset for $50, she will
do so only when it is efficient for her to acquire
the asset. Courtsdo not need to verifyJill'svaluation: the call option "harnesses"Jill's private
informationto the social enterpriseof allocating
the entitlementefficiently.
Similarly,put options can be useful when it is
the asset owner that has the privateinformation.
In the same example,let us assumethat Jack,the
owner, is the party with private information,
whose value is only knownto be distributeduniformly between 0 and $100, whereas Jill, the
potentialtaker,is knownto have a certainvalueof
$50. If Jackis granteda put optionto sell the asset
to Jill for $50, againhe will do so only when it is
efficient. The option, Ayres concludes,ought to
be assignedto the partywho has privateinformation. If both parties have private information
abouttheir valuationof the asset, a single-option
scheme would assignthe option to the one with
"more"privateinformation,thatis, the one whose
distributionis knownto have a largervariance.
Even better, both parties'privateinformation
can be "harnessed"under the scheme of dualchooser, described above. This would create an
improvementwheneverthe parties'distributions
have differentmeans, but relativelysimilarvariances. If, say,Jack,the owner,is knownto value
the asset between 0 and $100 and Jill, the potential taker, is known to value the asset between 20
and 120, a simple improvement can be obtained
by double-call options. Jill would exercise her call
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option whenever her value exceeds the exercise
price (say, $50, Jack'saverage value); Jack will
counter by exercisinghis reversecall option and
regainingownershipof the asset when his own
valuationalso exceeds this same, or a potentially
higher ($60), strikeprice.
In fact, even if both partiesare knownto have
identical distributions,an improvementcan be
gained under the dual-option scheme if the
prices under the two call optionsare "escalated."
Ayres develops the formula for the optimal
sequential options. For example, in the case in
which both parties' distributionof value is uniform between 0 and 100, an ideal dual option
scheme would entitle Jill to take the asset for a
price of $44.44, and for Jackto take it back for a
price of $66.67. Interestingly,notice that Jill
might decide to exercise her option even when
her valuationis less than $44.44 in the hope that
Jackwill buy the asset back and leave her with a
net gain. But the criticalpoint is that, with escalating prices, the asset is allocatedto the higher
valuermore often. Effectively,one might say,the
asset is auctionedto the competingbidders,with
the proceedsof the sale cleverlydividedbetween
the parties.
One of the most impressiveaccomplishments
of Ayres theory is the surgical precision with
which he isolatesefficiencyconcernsfromwealth
distributionand gives each a thoroughexamination. Ayres is writing againsta traditionof lawand-economics that is at times agnostic with
respect to distributive concerns (and focuses
solely on allocativeefficiency).He is also writing
against a traditionof mainstreamlegal scholarship that,while concernedprimarilywith fairness
and redistribution,lacks the rigorous tools to
determine analyticallyhow legal rules redistribute wealth. So while his theory prescribes the
allocationsof puts and calls accordingto the efficiency-minded"informationharnessing"criterion, he recognizes that such rules can be fine
tuned to achieveanyex post distributionthatpolicymakersdesire. Go back to Jackand Jill:if we
thinkthat grantingJill a $50 call option on Jack's
asset unfairlyaccordsJillthe entire surplus,there
is a simple solution. Jill can be requiredto pay
Jack some money irrespective of whether she
exercisesthe option. If she does not exercisethe
option, she will have pay Po;if she does, she will
have to pay Po + $50. This "Payor Pay"scheme
allows society to achieve any redistributionfrom
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Jillto Jack(andvice versa,ifpo < 0), andby maintainingthe $50 gap between Jill'stwo strategies,
it is guaranteedthat she will exercise the option
only when the value of the asset to her exceeds
$50. Courts, Ayres shows, can maximizethe ex
post surplusand at the same time preservetheir
"unfetteredcontrol"to divideit as they like.
Hence, piece by piece Ayresdemonstrateshow
optionscanbe designedto governthe "protection"
element of propertyrights.With all the pieces in
place, a striking claim emerges: ownership of
assetsneed not be protectedby propertyrules,but
rather by liabilityrules. An owner of an asset
shouldnot be entitled to preventor deter others
fromtakingher asset,nor shouldthe statepunish
or try to prevent nonconsensualtakings.All that
the owner should be getting in terms of protection, and all the statewill help her achieve,is the
paymentof a court-setsum of damagesafterthe
assetis takenfromher, and potentiallybe accorded a reciprocaloptionto reacquireher asset.Even
morefar-reaching,
an ownerof an assetwho wants
to sell it need not securethe agreementof a potentialbuyer.Instead,he couldhavea put optionand
dump the asset upon a nonconsensualrecipient,
again,for a priceset by law,andperhapssubjectto
the recipient'sreverseoptionto counterdumpthe
asset (potentially,though,for a lowerprice).
An importantclaim that Ayresmakeswith full
force throughoutthe bookconcernsthe superiority of the nonconsensualtransfermechanismand
the fact that this superiorityis maintainedeven
when bargainingis possibleand transactionscosts
are low. One would think-and law-and-economics writershave repeatedlyargued-that with low
costs of trade, the market-orientedconsensual
transfersystem would be preferableto a courtmandatedscheme,at the veryleastdue to the saving of legalcosts.ButAyresshowsotherwise.With
low transactionscosts, he argues, an individual
who is anxious about options being exercised
againsther (say,concernedthat her asset will be
takenfor some price)can "bribe"the holderof the
option and purchase a release from the option.
Andif she is concernedthatthe legallyset priceis
too high so that there will be no takers,she can
againget aroundit by offeringa lower consensual
price.Lowtransactionscostssmooththe operation
of crude options/liability
rulesjust as well as they
facilitateCoasiantransfersundera systemthatforbids nonconsensualtakings.But-and this is the
punch line-even with low transactionscosts,
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asymmetricinformationmaypreventefficientbargainsfrombeing struck.It is here that the system
of options has the advantageover "unstructured
bargaining"
by setting"clearchoicesand structure
that
responses" harnessprivateinformation.
0

0

0

There you have it, "OptionalLaw"-a legal
order of options that redesigns the baseline for
the transferof assetsin society.To many,lawyers
andnonlawyersalike,this scheme maysoundrevolutionary,putting more faith in courts and the
legal systemto regulateexchangethan in market
transactions,thus turningon its head the institution of propertyrights.But the case Ayresmakes
for OptionalLaw cannotbe dismissedmerelyon
the ground that it is so unorthodox.For one,
Ayresis well awarethathis theorymay"provetoo
much"and that factorsmitigatingits applicability
ought to be explored.Furthermore,throughout
the book Ayres uncovers many examples that
demonstratehow the law alreadyappliesvariants
of his option scheme in protectingentitlements.
The most powerfulexample,of course,is the protectionof contractualrights.Anglo-Americanlaw
allowsa partyto a contractto breachthe contract
unilaterally-that is, to "take"the contractual
right of the counterparty-and pay damages.
Contracts,then, are a species of entitlementthat
is already subject to call options. Ayres goes
beyond this obvious example and shows that in
manyother areasof the law, some quite esoteric
but others more central,rightsand entitlements
can be taken or conferred nonconsensually,
subjectto legallymandatedexerciseprices.
But the fact the legal systemoccasionallysamples the OptionalLaw scheme is still a long way
from the claim that it ought to be reformedto
conformto Ayres'svision of options throughout.
Even if classroomexperimentsor numericalsimulationsdemonstratethat entitlementssubjectto
call and put options lead to superiorbargaining
results,it is doubtfulwhetherthis book can truly
settle the debate and declarethe victoryof liability rules, and prove the inexistence of a theory
that can supporta regime of consensualtransactions. On a technicallevel, manyof the intuitions
fleshed out by Ayresare demonstratedin restrictive environments of incomplete information,
where the distributionof valuesis assumedto be
uniform.Otherwritershave shownthat for more

generaldistributionsof valueit wouldbe difficult
to generate legally workableformulaeof option
prices. But my critique here does not build on
any alleged technical shortfallsof the theory;in
fact, this theoryis at least as sound technicallyas
much of the law and economicsmodels that preceded it. Rather,in the remainingspace I wish to
sketchone directionthat a substantivecritiqueof
Ayres'stheoryof optionscan take.
One of the basicingredientsof OptionalLaw is
the put option-the possibilityof grantingthe
owner of an asset the option to force anotherto
buy the assetfor a court-setfixedsum, even if the
other is not interested in making a consensual
purchase. Put options, recall, are necessary
because the "harnessing"
insightrequiresthat in
an important set of cases, entitlements be
assignedto "optimalchooser"-the person with
the greatest variance of values--even if she is
known to have a lower mean. The lower mean
problem is resolved by granting the assigned
ownera put option.Thus,thistheorybuildson the
symmetrybetween put and call options ("deep
as Ayresrefersto it), maintainingthe
similarities,"
absence of an a priorireasonto prefer one type
over the other.But the overwhelmingtraditionof
the legal systemdenies this symmetry.While call
optionsare quiteabundant(damagerulesfor contractbreach,compulsorylicenses of patents,and
the right of factoriesto create compensatednuisancesaresome prominentexamples),put options
arestrikinglyrare.Ayresfindsa neatexamplehere
andthere,but thatonlyworksto emphasizethatit
takesAyresianingenuityto notice their existence,
for otherwise put options are too bizarre and
obscure.Even he recognizesthat their incidence
is lowerthanthat of call options.
For manylegal scholars,this descriptiveobservation about the rarityof put options in the law
would suffice in disprovingAyres'stheory.They
wouldconcludethatthere mustbe some underlying reason,not recognizedby Ayres,that undermines the validityof his thesis,or else why would
the law squandercenturiesof opportunityto "get
it right"?Why does the law generallyprohibitput
optionsand why is it fairlystingyin allowingcall
options?My argument,though, is not based on
"revealedpreference"by the law, but more concretelyon the existenceof a competingefficiency
perspective,focusingon the ex ante behaviorof
parties.Put options,we mightworry,subjectpeople to disruptionof their freedom to "be left
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alone."If you are not interested in owning my
Chevy and if you never made any gesture that
wouldhaveled me to believeyou mightbe a willing buyer,youwouldhateto findmy Chevyparked
in your lot, coupledwith a legallybackedobligation on yourpartto payfor it, howeverreasonable
the pricemightbe. True,thereis an allocativeefficiency argumentthat cannotbe denied:"onaverage," you may be a more efficient user of the
Chevythan me, especiallyif I privatelyknowthat
I trulydon'tneed the caranymore.It mayeven be
possibleto prove that you value my car. But you
may be reluctant,perhapsbecause you prefer to
shop aroundfor an even bettervehicle. My ability
to forceunwillingpartieslikeyou to payfor my car
gives me ample opportunityto extortthe likes of
you,folkswhowouldbe willingto paysome money
to be free fromthe disruptionthat my put option
imposes. Thus, a way to truly flourishin Ayres's
economyis to investin opportunitiesto extort:to
identifyallthose partieswho,whilethey objectively benefit from the asset (and are thus subjectto
the put option),they trulydo not want the asset.
Having identified such targets, an owner can
threatento exercisethe option,and be paidoff.
To gain a more concrete grip on the danger
underlyingAyres'sput optionscheme, thinkof all
the unsolicitedemailsindividualsreceivedaily,all
the junk mail offers and phone solicitations,marketingthis productor that.In the existingregime,
sellersneed to secure the assentof their targeted
buyers. Indeed, these pesteringcommunications
representsellers'effortto convinceskepticalbuyers to say yes. But if sellers had put options-if
they were allowedto deliverthe productwithout
the buyers'sayingyes and chargethe buyersthe
legally set price-individuals' freedom to be left
alone would be seriouslydisrupted.Even if the
recipientswould have a reciprocaloption, namely, the right to returnthe goods and be relieved
from the duty to pay, they would have to constantlybe on guard to avoid getting stuck with
unwantedbenefits.Individualsmayfind it worthy
to "bribe"sellers to take them off the marketing
list.Andwiththe growingpotentialto stickbuyers
with unwanted products or to extract "bribes,"
sellers would have greater incentive ex ante to
enter the businessof offeringunwantedbenefits.
The fact that regulatorsand courts have devised
rules that intend to protectconsumersfrom such
situationssuggeststhat the problemof unwanted
benefits maybe a seriousone.

Ayresis not obliviousto this risk, and at times
admitsthat the options he advocatesshould not
be operative between "strangers."But he does
not provide a theoretical yardstickto limit the
scope of his theory,and occasionallyfollows the
naturalconclusionthat the theory has unlimited
scope-that the option scheme ought to govern
all allocations.
In the end, Ayrescan be commended for recognizing that entitlements can be coupled with
more than one type of option-that there are
numerousdimensionsthat can be manipulatedin
designingthe options.His analyticalachievement
is significantin showing so cleanly how these
optionscan be designedto elicit privateinformation withoutsacrificingdistributiveconcerns.But
one mayworrythat some of these "dizzyingarray
of options,"as Ayres calls them, would in fact
create a dizzyingarrayof opportunitiesto pester
individualsinto deals they do not want, to take
from individualsassets that they do not wish to
sell, and to force individualsto spend time and
money defending againstthese risks.True, onesided optionscan overcomefailuresof consensual transactions that are due to asymmetric
information.But an exchangeeconomy in which
individualshave the right to determinewhether
to enter into a transaction,while perhapssacrificing some allocativeefficiency,mayhave other exante benefits that dwarfthe incrementalex-post
improvementof the option scheme.
Ayres'stheoryis indeed brilliantand intriguing,
certainto become a benchmarkin manydebates.
It providesnew understandingsfor some existing
legaltraditionsand it mayeven have the powerto
prescribesome new legal rules. But this reader,
for one, remainsskepticalwhetherthe theoryhas
a significantdomainof applicability.
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR

Professorof Law and Economics
Universityof MichiganLaw School
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